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Constitutional Law-Censorship of Films Used on TelevisionThe Pennsylvania State Board of Censors issued a regulation requiring that
all motion picture film intended for broadcast by television stations located
in Pennsylvania be submitted to the Board for censorship.' Five federally
licensed stations in the Commonwealth brought this action for a declaratory
judgment to determine the validity of this regulation. The regulation was
held invalid on the ground that the Federal Government has fully occupied
the field of television control.2 Allen B. DuMont Laboratories v. Carroll,
86 F. Supp. 813 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
The several states may, in the absence of federal action, regulate
interstate commerce as to matters of local concern, not requiring a uniform
national regulation.3 However, when Congress has provided a system of
regulation the states may not attempt to supplement it, 4 nor may they act
so that their policies reach a result inconsistent with the federal regulations.
Federal control of television is derived from the Communications Act of
1934 which established the Federal Communications Commission.6 The
Act specifically provided, however, that the Commission would not have
any power of censorship.7 This elimination of prior restraint did not leave
the Commission without power to exercise influence over the content of
radio and television programs. The system provided by the Act leaves the
primary decision as to program content to the stations, but they must8
answer to the Commission for failure to broadcast in the public interest.
If the FCC is not satisfied with a station's performance, it has in its arsenal
the tremendous sanction of refusing to renew its license.f Thus, Congress
1. There is no statute which would authorize the Pennsylvania censors to act in

regard to "live" television shows. The censors' action was taken under the motion
picture censorship act: "It shall be unlawful to . . . exhibit any motion picture
film, reel or view in Pennsylvania . . . unless duly approved by the Pennsylvania
State Board of Censors." PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 4, § 42 (Purdon, 1930).
2. The court also affirmed, without comment, plaintiff's request for conclusions
of law (1) that censorship is an unreasonable burden on commerce and (2) that television is included in the "Press" whose freedom is guaranteed by the First and Four-

teenth Amendments. If the Circuit Court should not agree that Congress has fully
occupied this field, the above two points must then be faced.
3. E.g., Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens of Philadelphia, 12 How. 298 (U.S.
1851).
4. LaCrosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336
U.S. 18 (1949) (state can't certify collective bargaining agent for interstate industry

even though federal agency has taken no action) ; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52
(1941) (state alien registration when federal has such registration) ; Erie R.R. v.
New York, 233 U.S. 671 (1914) (state maximum hours of work less than federal).
5. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
6. 48 STAT. 1064 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (Supp. 1948). Though the Act
does not mention television, there is no question that it is included under "radio" as
used in the Act. Oopenheim, Legal Aspects of Television, 8 AIR L. REv. 13, 26
(1937).
7. 48 STAT. 1064, 1091 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 326 (Supp. 1948).
8. 48 STAT. 1064, 1085 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 309 (a) (Supp. 1948).
9. Ibid.; Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d
850, 853 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 685 (1932) (denying renewal of license
because of offensive programs is not a taking of property without due process, nor is
it censorship or previous restraint). Actually such action by the Commission is pre-

vious restraint in the sense that the station is prevented from committing further
offenses.
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dealt fully with the possible abuse of radio and television in choosing a
method of self-regulation which avoided the dangers to free expression inherent in censorship. The failure of Congress expressly to prohibit state
censorship, while forbidding censorship by the FCC, almost certainly reassert such power,
sulted from failure to anticipate that the states would
10
rather than from a desire to allow state censorship.
There has never before been any adjudication of a state's power to
censor radio, since the states have never attempted to impose such restrictions." On the other hand, state censorship of motion pictures was early
approved as a proper exercise of the police power.' 2 However, no question
of federal supremacy has arisen in regard to motion picture censorship,
since the federal government has never regulated the content of motion
pictures. 13 There is an even greater public interest against immorality and
obscenity in television than in motion pictures, due to the intrusion of television into the home. Since each television program is shown only once,
the boycott sanction, used by pressure groups to force the movies to adhere to certain standards, cannot succeed in the new industry.' 4 Even if
there were no federal system of control, state censorship would be too burdensome to be allowed. The short periods for which television stations
rent film, plus the impossibility of foreseeing when a certain film will be
needed, make the close deadlines of television incompatible with the timeconsuming process of censorship. 15 Hence the need for federal contr6l
is accentuated, yet the present system of federal regulation is inadequate
in that the FCC has no administrative sanction to punish misconduct except
by suspension of license. 16 This one sanction is far too strong to use
against minor or infrequent violations, which are thus likely to remain
unpunished. 17 This problem caused little trouble in radio since the line
between good taste and obscenity in the spoken word is drawn with little
difficulty, so that any violation could be classified as flagrant or deliberate.
Television differs in that the boundary lines of obscenity in pictures and
decor are more tenuous, thus making it more difficult to justify such
10. 67 CONG. REc. 5480 (1926).
11. Cf. National Broadcasting Co. v. Board of Public Utility Comm'rs, 25 F.
Supp. 761 (D.N.J. 1938) (state cannot require certificate of public convenience to
operate a radio station). The states do retain jurisdiction over offenses that only
incidently occur in connection with radio, e.g., Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243
N.W. 82 (1932), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 599 (1935) (libel); Johnson v. WOW, 326
U.S. 120 (1945) (fraudulent conveyance of radio station).
12. "The exhibition of motion pictures is a business, pure and simple . . . like
other spectacles, and not . . part of the press." Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915). This case was decided while motion pictures were
still silent, and also before Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) established the
prohibition against state censorship of the press. Many modern writers believe that
the Supreme Court would ban motion picture censorship if the question were presented
again.

CHAFFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS

240 (1947),

ERNST, THE

FIRST FREEDOM 268 (1946).
13. Except for 46 STAT. 688 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1937) which prohibits importation of obscene pictures from abroad.
14. E.g., The Legion of Decency. Boycotts against television stations, except by
advertisers, would be highly impractical since most viewers have only one or two stations from which to choose and would be unwilling to give up television completely.
15. For a discussion of the practical difficulties which would be forced upon television by censorship, see Bergson, State Censorship of Television, 10 FED. BJ. 151
(1949).
16. Obscenity by radio is punished only by criminal action in the federal courts.
18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1948).
17. The FCC never revoked the license of a "major" station until 1945 (WOKO,
Albany) and this was for concealment of station ownership, not obscenity. WHITE,
THE AMERICAN RADIO 180 (1947).
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severe punishment. The solution would seem to be a continuation of the
present system of leaving primary control in the hands of the broadcasters,
but with the addition of a new power to the FCC allowing it to levy fines
for instances of indecency.' 8

Criminal Law-Causation-Responsibility of Robber for a Killing
by a Policeman-Defendant and two others, who had planned a hold-up
and armed themselves with pistols, robbed a supermarket. As they fled to
their car, two police cars drove up and attempted to block off their escape.
During the ensuing gun battle a patrolman, who was then off duty, was
killed while trying to subdue one of the robbers who was between him and
the policemen. The trial judge charged that, in determining defendant's
guilt under the Pennsylvania murder statute,' it would make no difference
who fired the fatal shot. The Supreme Court, Jones, J. dissenting, affirmed
a conviction of first degree murder with sentence of death, holding that
defendant's wrongful act was the proximate cause of the patrolman's death
although the fatal bullet was fired by a policeman. Commonwealth v.
Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949).
Criminal responsibility for a killing is imposed only where defendant's
act 2 is a substantially contributing cause of death. 3 Even though the
immediate cause of the death is the act of another person, responsibility
may sometimes be imposed. For example, where defendant induces a
physical response which results in death, 4 or knowingly furnishes an innocent or irresponsible person with the means to bring about death,5 he is
a legal cause of the death since his act is a substantially contributing factor
in bringing about that result. However, where the immediate cause of
death is the act of a responsible person who is stirred into activity by defendant's conduct, it has generally been held that defendant is not responsible,6 on the theory that such an act intervenes between defendant's act
18. This proposal has been made by the Senate Committee on Interstate and

Foreign Commerce, but no action has been taken. 95 CONG. REc. 561 (January 27,
1949).
1. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 4701 (Purdon, 1945). "All murder which shall be
committed in the perpetration of, or attempting to perpetrate any arson, rape,

robbery, burglary, or kidnapping, shall be murder in the first degree."
2. Or the act of one acting in concert with him. E.g., Spies v. People, 122 Ill. 1,

12 N.E. 865 (1887).

3. 2 BIsHoP, NEiw CRIMixAL LAW § 637 (9th ed., Zane & Zollmann, 1923). "The
contribution, however, must be of such magnitude, and so near the result, that sustaining to it the relation of contributory cause to effect, the law takes it within its
cognizance."

4. E.g., Cox v. People, 80 N.Y. 500 (1880) (fright produced heart attack) ; Regina v. Towers, 12 Cox C.C. 530 (1874) (scream scared child into convulsions) ; cf.
Regina v. Halliday, 61 L.T. 701 (1889) (defendant's threats made wife jump from
window). See also note 8 infra.
5. Johnson v. State, 142 Ala. 70, 38 So. 182 (1905) (freeing insane man) ; Queen
v. Saunders, 2 Plow. 473 (1576),

75 Eng. Rep. 706 (1905)

(intended victim gave

poisoned apple to her daughter not knowing it was poisoned apple to her daughter not
knowing it was poisoned).
6. E.g., Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905) ; Butler v.
People, 125 Ill. 641, 18 N.E. 338 (1888); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. 541
(1863); see Commonwealth v. Thompson, 321 Pa. 327, 330, 184 AtI. 97, 99 (1936);
Commonwealth v. Mellor, 294 Pa. 339, 343, 144 Atl. 534, 535 (1928). Contra: People
v. Payne, 359 Ill. 246, 194 N.E. 539 (1935). The Moore case is the only case
holding directly contra to the instant decision, but both the Butler and Campbell cases
have dicta strongly supporting the result in that case.
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and the ultimate result thus rendering the relation between them insub-

stantial. 7 It would seem, therefore, that under the facts of the present case
defendant would not be responsible, since the intervening responsible act
of the policeman prevents any substantial relation between the felony and
the patrolman's death. Furthermore, the result reached by the court
cannot be supported by analogy to the shield cases 8 in which, although
the fatal bullet is fired by another responsible person, there is an additional

act by the criminal in forcing the victim into the line of fire.2 Responsibility is imposed in these cases because this additional act is a substantially
contributing cause of the death, and not because the criminal created a
dangerous situation. 10 In the present case, the patrolman was not used
as a shield; he came into the combat on his own initiative. Defendant's
only act was that which created the dangerous situation, and that alone
would not make him responsible.
Although there has been a tendency, particularly in Pennsylvania, to
extend the limits of responsibility in cases of felony-murder," the instant
case represents a further step in its definition of what constitutes a substantially contributing cause.' 2 Drawing an analogy to tort law,' 3 the court
lays down a standard of proximate cause in which it is sufficient that defendant's act initiate the chain of events which culminates in death, if the
consequences which may result from the intervention of another human
force are foreseeable by him.' 4 Thus, since the robbers in the present case
7. WHARTON, Ho miclm § 28 (3d ed., Bowlby, 1907). "To hold a person criminally responsible for a homicide, his act must have been the proximate cause of the
death as distinguished from the cause of a condition affording an opportunity for the
compassing of the death by some other unconnected agency." See also Note, 81 U. OF
PA. L. REV. 189, 194 (1932). The determination of what constitutes an "unconnected
agency" is, of course, a question of policy. See HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 256 et seq. (1947).
8. Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68 S.W.2d 100 (1934) ; Taylor v. State, 41 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 564, 55 S.W. 961 (1900) ; Keaton v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 621, 57
S.W. 1125 (1900).
The TaYlor case apparently adopts the principles behind the
Butler and Campbell cases. See note 6 supra.
9. Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947), relied on as authority by the court in the instant case, is virtually a shield case. See dissenting opinion
of Gordon, P.J., in Commonwealth v. Almeida, 66 Pa. D. & C. 351, 373 (1949), which
distinguishes the factual situations.
10. See note 7 supra.
11. Commonwealth v. Moyer, supra; Commonwealth v. Kelly, 333 Pa. 280, 4 A.2d
805 (1939) ; Commonwealth v. Doris, 287 Pa. 547, 135 Atl. 313 (1926); Commonwealth v. Lessner, 274 Pa. 108, 118 Atl. 24 (1922).
12. Cf. People v. Payne, supra. Letner v. State, 156 Tenn. 68, 299 S.W. 787
(1927), which appears to sustain the court's position, represents an extreme view.
See Note, 55 A.L.R. 921 (1928).
See HALL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 261: "No
one is responsible for what others with whom he is not allied do or bring about."
13. Courts will frequently impose tort liability upon a negligent wrongdoer even
though there was intervening negligent or even criminal conduct on the part of others.
E.g., Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 790
(1944) (torts of thieves when keys left in car) ; Nearing v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 383 Ill.
366, 50 N.E.2d 497 (1943) (girl left at unlighted station attacked) ; Brower v. N.Y.
Cent. & H.R. RR., 91 N.J.L. 190, 103 AtI. 447 (1918) (theft of apples scattered by
collision). Contra: Galbraith v. Levin, 323 Mass. 255, 81 N.E.2d 560 (1948) (same
situation as Ross case, supra, recovery denied) ; cf. Ritter v. Olson, 263 Pa. 40, 68 A.2d
732 (1949) (man freeing stuck car did not apply brakes). The court appears to ignore
the differences in objectives of criminal and tort liability. See Commonwealth v.
Moyer, supra, commented on in 96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 278, 280 (1947). And see HALL,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 188 et seq., 258-261.
14. Commonwealth v. Moyer, supra at 190, 53 A.2d at 741. "It is equally consistent with reason and sound public policy to hold that when a felon's attempt to
commit robbery or burglary sets in motion a chain of events which were or should
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could foresee that policemen would intervene, and that someone might be
shot in their efforts to escape, they are responsible just as though their
act was the immediate cause of the patrolman's death. Although such a
standard might appear very broad, it would seem that an armed felon will
not be absolutely responsible for all acts of those attempting to apprehend
him. The court stresses the fact that the policeman's response was a
normal response under the circumstances. In view of the immediacy of the
danger and the necessity for action to forestall further harm, it is foreseeable that a policeman might shoot and kill a bystander. In all probability future decisions will expressly limit the finding that the creation of
a dangerous situation is a substantially contributing cause of a resulting
death to situations where these factors are present.' 5 Although the dissent
argues that the problem is one of fact since the jury must in every case
decide whether an unbroken chain of events existed,' 6 the determination
of the standard of causation to be applied calls for a decision of policy, to
be declared by the court in the light of the objectives of criminal law 17 as
well as the circumstances of each particular case.

Criminal Law-Federal Employees as Jurors in the Trial of a
Communist-Gerhart Eisler, an Austrian national, was indicted in the
District Court of the District of Columbia for knowingly making false statements in his application for permission to depart from the United States.'
Whether defendant was a member of the Communist Party was an issue
of the trial. The defendant moved to exclude all government employees
from the jury on the ground that they were subject to investigation and
discharge for Communist affiliation or sympathy, 2 and hence could not be
impartial jurors. In affirming the conviction, the Circuit Court of Appeals,
relying on the general principle that government employees are qualified
jurors, summarily held that there was no error in denying defendant's
motion.3 Eisler v. United States, 176 F. 2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
have been within his contemplation when the motion was initiated, he should be held
responsible for any death which by direct and almost inevitable sequence results from
the initial criminal act." (Quoted with approval in the instant case at 602, 68 A.2d
at 599).
15. Cf. People v. Payne, miukra. There the person whose act caused the death
shot in defense of the victim. Without these factors, it is doubtful whether the intervening act would be a "normal response."
16. Commonwealth v. Kelly, supra at 288, 4 A.2d at 808. "The jury must first
decide whether the homicide act was connected with the felony or was there 'a break
in the chain of events.'" See dissent in instant case at 641, 68 A.2d at 617.
17. For an interesting discussion of the objectives of criminal law, see HALL, op.
cit. supra note 2, at 188 et seq. See also Commonwealth v. Ritter, 13 Pa. D. & C. 258
(Phila. Q.S. 1930); Commonwealth v. Levin, 66 Pa. D. & C. 55 (Phila. Q.S. 1949).
1. 40 STAT. 559 (1918), 22 U.S.C. §223(c) (1946). ". . . it shall . . . be unlawful. . . . For any person knowingly to make any false statement in an application for permission to depart from or enter the United States with intent to induce or
secure the granting of such permission either for himself or for another."
2. This contention was based on the President's Loyalty Order. Exec. Order
No. 9835, 12 FED. REG. 1935 (1947), which prescribed general rules for discovering
and dismissing disloyal employees.
3. In summarily rejecting defendant's assignment of error, the court relied on
Dennis v. United States, 171 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1948). That case can be distinguished from this one. Although the defendant there was a Communist, the court
said, ". . . the case now before this court has nothing to do with the fact that Dennis is a Communist. It has solely to do with the question of whether he wilfully
failed to respond to the subpoena of a lawful committee to Congress."
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Prior to 1935, the Supreme Court had held that a government employee could not be a juror in an action to which the government was a
party. 4 This rule was based on the supposition that bias would result
from the employer-employee relationship. 5 However, after Congress enacted a statute making government workers eligible jurors, 6 the Supreme
Court reconsidered its former position and upheld the act.7 Consequently,
the law now is well established that there can be no imputation of bias
simply by virtue of government employment; 8 but the cases indicate that
special and exceptional circumstances might arise in which the general rule
would not be applicable. Thus far, no case has provided such an exceptional situation; 9 and the mere possibility of government workers fearing
the loss of employment has expressly been held not a sufficient ground,
without more, to impute bias. 10 Nevertheless, the defendant in the instant
case contended that the President's Loyalty Order - which provided for
dismissal of government employees with Communist affiliation or sympathy
brought this case within the special circumstances exception to the general
rule.
The previous cases holding that fear of loss of employment was too
remote a contingency to imply bias are readily distinguishable on their
facts from the instant case.' 2 None of them, with the exception of the
Dennis case, even mentioned the question of Communist affiliation or
sympathy, and in the Dennis case the court said that the fact that the defendant was a member of the Communist Party had no bearing on the
issue.13 In addition, when the leading cases were decided the civil service regulationis offered adequate protection to the worker. Discharge could
be had only for cause '4 which did not include sympathy for certain political
views. This protection was not available to government employees after
the Loyalty Order went into operation. At the time of Eisler's trial the
government was conducting an intensive campaign to root out all subversive elements. In most cases of alleged disloyalty the guilt or innocence
of the accused government employee turned on charges of association with
4. Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183 (1908).
5. This view was based primarily on 3 Br- Comm. *363, where it was said one is
not competent as a juror if he is a party's master, servant, counsellor, steward, or
attorney.
6. 49 STAT. 682 (1935), D.C. CODE, tit. 11, § 1420 (1940) (with certain specified
exceptions government employees were declared qualified jurors).
7. The statute was held not to violate the Sixth Amendment after a re-examination of the common law authorities produced no settled policy of disqualifying Crown
employees from jury service where the king was a party. United States v. Wood,
299 U.S. 123 (1936) ; 50 HARV. L. Rxv. 692 (1937).
( 8. E.g., United States v. Wood, soPra; Higgins v. United States, 160 F.2d 222
(D.C. Cir. 1946) ; A & P v. District of Columbia, 89 F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
9. Several cases indicated, however, that one possible exception is where the jurymen are employed by the department most vitally affected by the litigation. E.g.,
Higgins v. United States, supra; Jordan v. United States, 87 F.2d 64(D.C. Cir. 1937).
10. See United States v. Wood, supra, at 150. "It is suggested that an employee
of the government may be apprehensive of the termination of his employment in case
he decides in favor of the accused in a criminal case. Unless the suggestion be taken
to have reference to some special and exceptional case, it seems to us far-fetched and
chimerical."
11. The heart of this document is part IV, § (f), which provides that a government employee may be considered disloyal on the basis of affiliation with or sympathetic association with any organization designated as subversive.
12. E.g., Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497 (1948) (involved a prosecution
for violation of the Harrison Narcotics Act) ; United States v. Wood, supra.
13. Dennis v. United States, supra.
14. FIELD, CiviL SERVICE LAW, 187-198 (1939).
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other persons tainted with suspicion. 15 Naturally, therefore, an average
government worker could reasonably be expected to be apprehensive of
acquitting a Communist. 16 In view of these facts, the court could have
justifiably distinguished the other cases, and found bias growing out of the
unique conditions of this particular case. By refusing to do so, the court
has rejected what apparently is the strongest possible combination of circumstances that could make for an exception to the rule. In effect, then,
it seems to have read out of the previous decisions the possibility that such
an exception could arise.

Income Taxation-Deductibility of Payments Made Under Agreement Incident to Divorce-Petitioner was granted a Florida divorce
without personal service on his wife, a New Jersey resident, and without
appearance on her behalf. Eight months after the divorce, he concluded
a written agreement with his ex-wife promising to pay her support money
in consideration of her promise not to "contest or bring any action . . .
to set aside, nullify, or question the . . . decree of divorce."

An income

tax deduction by the petitioner for payments made under this agreement
was disallowed. The decision of the Tax Court ' sustaining the diswas not "inallowance was affirmed on the ground that the agreement
2
cident to" the divorce within the meaning of the Code.

Cox v. Commis-

sioner, 176 F. 2d 226 (3d Cir. 1949).
Prior to 1942, for income tax purposes, a husband's payments to his
wife during marriage and after divorce were neither includible in her gross
income 3 nor deductible from his. 4 In the Revenue Act of 1942, Congress
remedied this hardship upon the alimony-paying spouse 5 by providing,
in general, that payments by a husband6 to his divorced or legally separated7
wife are taxable income of the wife and deductions for the husband.
These provisions apply not only to periodic support payments ordered by
the divorce decree but also to such payments made pursuant to a written
agreement between husband and wife if the instrument is "incident to such
divorce or separation." By including these agreements, Congress recog15. ROGGE, OUR

VANISHING CIVIL LIBERTIES

(1949).

See especially chapters 10-

13, where the author gives numerous examples. Generally on the effect of the Loyalty
Order, see O'Brian, Loyalty Tests and Guilt by Association, 61 HARV. L. REv. 592
(1948); Emerson and Helfeld, Loyalty Among Government Employees, 58 YALE
L.J. 1.
16. See Frazier v. United States, supra, at 514 (dissenting opinion).
1. Benjamin B. Cox, 10 T.C. 955 (1948) (3 judges dissenting).
2. INT. REv. CODE § 23 (u) allows as deductions from gross income those amounts
includible in gross income of his wife under § 22(k) which provides as follows:
"Alimony, etc., income. In the case of a wife who is divorced or legally
separated from her husband under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance,

periodic payments . . . received subsequent to such decree in discharge of . . .

a legal obligation which, because of the marital or family relationship, is imposed
upon or incurred by such husband under such decree or under a written instruinent incident to such divorce or separation shall be includible in the gross income
of such wife, and such amounts received as are attributable to property so transferred shall not be includible in the gross income of such husband ...

"

(Italics

added.)
3. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917).
4. Douglas v. Wilcox, 296 U.S. 1 (1935).
5. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 71-72 (1942); SEN. REP. No. 1631,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1942).
6. INT. REv. CODE § 22(k). See note 2 supra.
7. INT. REv. CODE § 23 (u). See note 2 supra.
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nized that under certain circumstances parties prefer not to open their

financial arrangements to the public in the divorce decree.8 However,
the courts have encountered some difficulty in determining when agreements not incorporated by reference in the decree are "incident to" the
divorce. 9 Although agreements made prior to the decree have been held
"incident to" the divorce, 10 the Tax Court, to date, has ruled that payments
under an instrument made subsequent to the decree are not deductible."
The court has considered such payments gifts because the legal obligation
to support is generally terminated by the divorce decree. However, when
a divorce is granted upon constructive service of process without appearance by the wife, as in the instant case, she may recover alimony at the
matrimonial domicile in an independent action. 1 2 By indicating, in effect,
that an instrument must be executed prior to or coincident with the divorce
decree to be "incident to such divorce," 13 the Circuit Court has applied
previous interpretations of the Act to a situation which might impel a
4
broader construction to avoid unusual tax consequences.'
Under the circumstances of this case, the divorce decree did not end
the obligation to support, and payments made under the subsequent agreement were in recognition of the husband's legal duty. If the Act is limited
to obligations made prior to or contemporaneous with the divorce decree,
payments made under an independent alimony decree, or an agreement in
lieu thereof, would not be deductible by the husband. Thus, the wife may
be inclined to shift the tax burden to her ex-husband by claiming alimony
in a separate action rather than entering an appearance in a divorce suit
instituted against her by constructive service. It is improbable that Congress intended such an application of an act which was specifically drafted
to relieve the husband who has a legal obligation to support his ex-wife. 15
8. Another situation in which an agreement must be used to make financial
arrangements is presented by the Pennsylvania rule which prevents the award of
alimony by the court in an absolute decree of divorce. However, in Tuckie G. Hesse,
7 T.C. 700 (1946). payments under an agreement for support were held to be deductible by the husband.
9. E.g., Commissioner v. Murray, 174 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1949) (agreement
changing terms of alimony granted in decree held "incident"), reversing 7 CCH
1948 TC MEM. DEc. 16,452 (1948) ; Frank J. DuBane, 10 T.C. 992 (1949) (agreement subsequent to divorce which reduced to writing oral agreement made prior to
divorce held "incident") ; Robert Wood Johnson, 10 T.C. 647 (1949) (agreement
conditioned on wife's applying for divorce held "incident) ; Frederick S. Dauwalter,
9 T.C. 580 (1947) (agreement subsequent to divorce held not "incident") ; Tuckie G.
Hesse, mtpra.

10. Robert Wood Johnson, supra; Tuckie G. Hesse, supra.
11. Frederick S. Dauwalter, supra; cf. Frank J. DuBane, =supra.
12. Toncray v. Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476, 482-492, 131 S.W. 977, 978-981 (1910);
Turner v. Turner, 44 Ala. 437, 451 (1870) ; Thurston v. Thurston, 58 Minn. 279, 59
N.W. 1017 (1894); Cox v. Cox, 19 Ohio St. 502, 512 (1869); cf. Thompson v.
Thompson, 226 U.S. 551 (1913) (statute of state issuing divorce decree prevented
alimony to wife under any circumstances). Some statutes give wife a claim for
alimony in an independent suit subsequent to divorce. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN., tit. 2,
§ 50-37 (Supp. 1949).
13. ".

.

. 22(k) envisages a situation in which the agreement . . . is part of

the package of the divorce. The term 'divorce' . . . does not refer to status, but
encompasses the breaking-up of the marriage eventuating in its dissolution, and
divestment of marital obligations as provided in the decree." Instant case at 229.
14. The instant decision appears to be the only appellate consideration of a situation in which a subsequent agreement provided for support payments in the absence
of any alimony arrangements in the divorce decree. Cf. Commissioner v. Murray,
mspra, in which a subsequent agreement changed the terms of the alimony provided
inthe decree.
15. See note 5 mspra.
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Therefore, it appears that "incident to such divorce" should be construed
to refer to the continuing status of the legal obligationto support and not to
the time of the agreement relative to the divorce decree. Only such an
interpretation would give effect to the legislative purpose of the enactment.

Income Taxation-Deductibility of Premiums Paid for Convertible
Bonds Under the Amortization Provisions-A cash basis taxpayer in
1944 invested $60,000 in A. T. & T. 3% convertible bonds. These bonds
had a face value of only $50,000, but were callable on thirty days notice
for $52,000. They also contained a stock purchase option under which the
bonds could be exchanged for A. T. & T. stock.' The high premium
($10,000) was attributable in large part, if not entirely, to this convertible
feature.2 Since the taxpayer did not dispose of the bonds in 1944, he
deducted from his gross income for that year $8,000 pursuant to the
statutory provisions relating to "amortizable bond premium." ' The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, asserting that the premium was manifestly
paid for the option to purchase stock, and not to secure a more favorable
interest rate, disallowed the deduction. On appeal, the court held the
deduction proper. Commissioner v. Korell, 176 F. 2d 151 (2d Cir. 1949).
In another circuit, in a case involving the same issue of bonds but a different taxpayer, the court sustained the Commissioner. Commissioner v.
Shoong, 177 F. 2d 131 (9th Cir. 1949).
Prior to 1942 cash basis taxpayers were not permitted to amortize
bond premiums, and such amounts were treated as capital loss when the
bonds matured, if not previously sold or exchanged. This treatment, however, was not in accord with sound accounting practice, and resulted in a
distortion of the taxpayer's true income. 4 In the ordinary case "bond
premium" is an amount paid for a bond in excess of its maturity value
because the interest rate to be received is higher than the prevailing rate.
In such a situation a pro rata part of the premium should be considered as
allocable to each year's interest, and therefore deductible in computing the
true yield of the bond. For example, if the prevailing rate of interest is
2Yo, a $1,000 bond bearing interest at 3% and due in 1960 might sell
today for $1,050. The purchaser of the bond would receive $30 "interest"
annually, but only $25 of this amount would be true income, the remaining
$5 being a return of capital. Motivated by a desire to have income under
the tax law reflect as nearly as possible the true income of the taxpayer,
1. The bondholder was entitled to purchase A.T. & T. common stock, then selling
for $163 per share, by paying $40 in cash and surrendering $100 of the principal
amount of the bonds for each share of stock.
2. The stock consistently sold for about $40 more than the bonds from June 1943
to August 1947. The differential of 40 was obviously controlled by the $40 cash
payment required for conversion. See note 1, sipra. Under the circumstances which
existed here, such a price relationship is normal. See JomE, CORPORATION FINA CE,
195, 196 (1948) ; BURcHETT, INVESTMENTS AND INVESTMENT PoLicy, 219 (1938).
3. INT. REV. CODE §§23(v), 125; U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.125-1 et seq. (1943).
In the case of a callable bond, the bond premium is the excess of the basis for determining loss (usually cost) over the amount payable on the earliest call date. Amortizable bond premium is the part of the premium attributable to the taxable year.
Here, since the bonds were callable on thirty days notice, if any part of the premium
was deductible, it was all attributable to the taxable year.
4. "The want of statutory recognition of the sound accounting practice of amortizing premium leads to incorrect tax results." H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77 Cong., 1st
Sess. (1942) ; 1942-2 Cum. BULL 410 (1942) ; Hearings before Committee on Ways
and Means on H.R. 7378, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 90, 117; SPRAGUE, TE ACCOUNTANCY
OF INVESTMENT §§ 109, 119, 121 (Perrine's ed. 1918).
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Congress in 1942 amended the Code to allow a deduction
each year for the
"amortizable bond premium" attributable thereto.5 Congress thus recognized that only the actual yield of a bond should be considered income. 6
However, the amendment was not phrased to exclude premiums paid for
a convertible feature, and the term "bond" was defined very broadly.
Moreover, the committee reports stated that in the case of convertible
bonds, if the option to convert the bonds was in the owner, the deduction
would be allowed.7 Even the Treasury Regulations did not distinguish
between premiums paid to secure a higher rate of interest, and other
premiums. 8 In the Korell case the court concluded that the plain language
of the Code, in conjunction with the explanation in the Committee reports,
was too strong an indication of the intent of Congress to permit reading
into the statute a limitation as to the kind of bond premium for which the
deduction is allowable. In contrast, the court in the Shoong case thought
that the reasons which led Congress to amend the law should be kept in
mind in deciding what premiums are deductible. Looking at the entire
history of the provision, and noting that deductions are always construed
narrowly, the court held that "amortizable bond premium" does not include
an amount paid primarily for an option to purchase stock.
The premium, in the instant cases, was obviously paid for the stock
option, and not, as in the case of the ordinary bond premium, for an
interest return above the prevailing rate.9 Under these circumstances it
would seem that the deduction of loss, if any, should await disposition of
the bonds. Cash basis taxpayers have always been limited to deductions
for expenses and costs actually incurred in the taxable year, and have never
been permitted to deduct purely hypothetical losses.10 Here, the premium
for the bond was paid to obtain an option to purchase speculative stock, not
a better rate of interest; actual loss was contingent upon a decline in the
5. IiNT. REV. CoDE §§ 23 (v), 125. Another purpose was to prohibit an unjustifiable
deduction of bond premium as a capital loss by holders of fully tax exempt bonds,
who under the prior law were permitted to treat such premiums as a capital loss at
maturity of the bonds in spite of the fact that the corresponding amount of capital had
been recovered in the guise of interest and no tax had been paid upon it. See 1942-2
Cum. BULL., 410, 432 (1942).

6. To illustrate: T buys a fully taxable 3% bond on Jan. 1, 1950 for $1,050. At
maturity, on Jan. 1, 1960 T will receive $1,000. The interest, $30, must be included
in gross income each year. If T does not elect to amortize the $50 premium, assuming
he is a cash basis taxpayer, he will be entitled to a capital loss deduction of $25 in
1960 ($50 recognized loss, but only 50% taken into account). But if he wishes, T
may elect to "amortize" the premium, and deduct $5 in each of the ten years intervening between purchase and maturity. In that event, of course, T will have no capital
loss in 1960, since he is required to reduce the basis for computing gain or loss by
the amount of the amortization.
7. 1942-2 Cum. BuLL. 433, 576 (1942).
8. "The fact that the bond is callable or convertible into stock does not, in itself,
prevent the application of § 125. . . . A convertible bond is within the scope of
§ 125 if the option to convert on a date certain specified in the bond rests with the
holder thereof." U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 125-5 (1943). The Commissioner contended that the words "on a date certain specified in the bond" barred application of
the deduction to the bonds in the instant cases, but the Tax Court (10 T.C. 1001)
and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the quoted words were an invalid
part of the regulations.
9. See note 2 supra. "The evidence incontrovertibly sustained the Commissioner's

holding that the premium was paid solely for the stock purchasing covenant."
missioner v. Shoong, mipra.
10. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935)

Com-

(reorganization not given effect

as a tax-free exchange where no business purpose evident, although carried out in the
precise form required by the statute for non-recognition of gain or loss) ; Higgins
v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940) (deduction denied for loss on sale of stock to wholly
owned corporation notwithstanding statutory language appearing to permit it).
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price of A. T. & T. common stock, and was not, as in the case of the
ordinary bond premium, certain to be realized by the mere passage of
time." Moreover, the effect of permitting the deduction was not only
to give the taxpayer an election as to which year he would report a substantial part of his income, but also, because of the favorable treatment of
long term capital gain, to avoid altogether the tax on an amount equal
to one-half of the deduction, when the bonds are later sold. Thus, in the
Korell case, notwithstanding the $8,000 deduction in 1944, if the bonds
had been sold in 1945 for cost after being held for six months, only $4,000
would have to be returned as taxable income in 1945 because of the special
provisions applicable to capital gain.12 That Congress could have intended
such an unreasonable result is inconceivable.' 3 Although the decision in
the Kordl case may be justified by the language of the Code and the committee reports, it wholly disregards the artificiality of the alleged deduction,
and the absence of any relation to true income. On the other hand, the
conclusion in the Shoong case would appear to be in accord with the intent
of Congress to limit taxable income from a bond to the actual yield.
Moreover, the decision recognizes that as a practical matter, the taxpayer's
true income has not been adversely affected by the mere14passage of time,
as it would be in the case of the ordinary bond premium.
Income Taxation-Transfer of Corporate Assets to a Family Partnership-The taxpayer, sole owner of a manufacturing corporation,
decided to change the form of business to a partnership. He then made
an absolute gift to his wife of one-half of the corporate stock. Three weeks
later, the taxpayer and his wife transferred the corporate assets to the
newly formed partnership, thereupon executing a partnership agreement
providing for equal sharing of profits but with the exclusive management
vested in the taxpayer. Commissioner contended that the taxpayer is
taxable on his wife's share of partnership earnings as well as his own,
since the wife performed no business services and contributed no capital
which originated with her. The Tax Court rejected the Commissioner's
contention, holding that the wife was a partner for tax purposes since the
parties "intended" to carry on the business as a partnership. Edward A.
Theurkauf, CCH 1949 FED. TAx REP. 17,226 (T.C. 1949).
Generally where there is an absolute intra-family transfer of income
producing property the donee is taxable on the income earned after the
transfer.' A donor's attempt, however, merely to assign future income for
11. The premium that an ordinary bond will command gradually diminishes as the
bond approaches maturity, or an earlier call date.
12. INT. RYV. CODE § 117(b). Only 50% of gain or loss from sale of a "capital
asset" held for more than six months is taken into account.
13. In this respect the Shoong case is particularly striking. Taxpayer in 1944
purchased $500,000 principal amount of convertible bonds for $606,000. He sold these
bonds in Jan. 1945 for $621,000. Nevertheless, he claimed, and the Tax Court on
the authority of the Korell case allowed, a deduction from gross income for 1944
of $81,000, thereby reducing his 1944 income tax by more than $60,000. In computing
gain on the sale in 1945 the taxpayer, of course, subtracted the $81,000 from his basis.
thus increasing the recognized gain by that amount; but inasmuch as only 50% of
the gain is taken into account, the net tax saving to the taxpayer, if permitted to
deduct the premium in 1944, would be very large.
14. "The stock option value of the bonds here involved would not decrease by
the mere passage of time to the call or maturity date contemplated by the statute."
Shoong case. supra.
1. Cf. Blair v. Comm'r, 300 U.S. 5 (1937); Austin v. Comm'r, 161 F.2d 666
(6th Cir. 1947).
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relatively short periods of time while at the same time retaining complete
control and management over the income producing property is ineffectual
to transfer the tax liability to the assignee.2 The result in these gratuitous
assignment cases has been based on the rationale that while under state
law there has been a valid transfer of property, for federal revenue purposes, the person who controls the economic source of the income is subjected to the tax.3 Following this reasoning the Supreme Court in Comm'r
v. Tower, on facts nearly identical with those of the instant case, sustained
the Tax Court's determination that the donor, as the exclusive managing
partner, was taxable on the entire partnership earnings. 4 The donor was
said to have retained the economic control over the donee's partnership
interest because the substance of the transaction clearly revealed that the
donor was merely distributing a portion of his business income to other
family members without changing his economic position in relation to the
business. The mere fact that the form of the gift was conditional upon
the donee placing her share of the corporate assets into the contemplated
partnership was thought to be irrelevant. 5 More recently, however, in
Comm'r v. Culberston the Supreme Court has held that a partner's status
for tax purposes cannot be determined solely by such objective factors as
active participation in the business or original capital contribution.' The
Court emphasised that the correct approach is to examine all the circumstances under which the partnership is formed in order to determine
whether the parties subjectively intended to carry on the business as a
partnership. 7 In the few decisions since Comm'r v. Culberston, the Tax
Court has sharply divided both as to the meaning and application of this
subjective standard.8 The majority of the court in the instant case distinguished Comn'r v. Tower on the strength of the taxpayer's testimony
that there had been no condition attached to the gift of corporate stock
requiring his wife to transfer her share of the corporate assets to the contemplated partnership. The court, attempting to follow the subjective
intent standard of the Culberston case, gave decisive weight to the form
of the gift ignoring the substance of the transaction, i. e., that the organization of the contemplated partnership had already been decided upon shortly
prior to the gift of the corporate stock.
Although the split-income provision of the Revenue Act of 1948 has
eliminated the problem of husband-wife partnerships, 9 yet the effect of the
Culberston decision, as exemplified by the instant case, will give additional
impetus to arrangements which contemplate spreading the business income
over other family members as inactive business partners. 10 The standard
2. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331

(1940).

3. See Mr. Justice Stone in Helvering v. Horst, supra, at 114, "Underlying
the reasoning in these cases is the thought that income is 'realized' by the assignor
because he, who owns or controls the source of the income also controls the disposition of that which he could have received himself and diverts the payment from himself to others as means of procuring the satisfaction of his wants."
4. Comm'r v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946).

5. Id. at 287.

6. Comm'r v. Culberston, 69 Sup. Ct. 1210 (1949).
7. Manheimer & Mook, A Taxwise Evaluation of Family Partnerships,32 IOWA
L. REv. 436 (1948).
8. See E.g., W. F. Harmon, CCH 1949 FED. TAx REP. 17, 196 (T.C. 1949).
9. INT. REv. CODE § 12(d).
10. In this connection it seems favorable from the taxpayer's standpoint to sue
for a tax refund in the federal district court since he can there demand a jury trial
on the subjective intent issue, rather than choose the deficiency route to the Tax

Court.
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of appraisal imposed by the Supreme Court in the Culberston case is vague
in that it does not disclose what objective guides are to be utilized in
ascertaining the intent of the parties." The instant result demonstrates
the susceptibility of the Culberston decision to a meaning opposed to the
basic principle that the income tax is based on the ability to pay, since it
sanctions a sham transaction whereby the taxpayer escapes the normal
operation of the progressive tax. Looking through the form of the so-called
absolute gift, the substance of the transaction here reveals that the family
producer of income, while retaining his economic control over the business,
has merely distributed the business earnings over other family members to
obtain the advantage of the lower surtax rates.' 2 Since the Culberston
decision clearly does not require the instant result it seems desirable that
the Treasury promulgate regulations fixing the tax burden on the donor,
who as the moving spirit in the formation of the family partnership actually
creates the right to receive the business earnings. 13

Public Utilities-Free Transfers in Street Railway Rate Schedule
Banned as "Unreasonably Discriminatory"-Petitioner sought a base
fare increase from the PUC to meet higher operating costs and a reduced
level of riding. The profferred rate schedule retained the petitioner's free
transfer system. The commission found a necessity for increased revenues,
but it declared the petitioner's plan unduly discriminatory in so far as
multiple-vehicle passengers paid the same rate as did single-car riders.
To meet the deficit it was ordered that charges be levied upon transfers.
City of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., Pa. P. U. C.,
Docket #14522 (1949).
Public Utility Commissions have been designed to protect the public
interest in the activities of utility companies.' They are concerned both
with the adequacy of service afforded their customers and with the reasonableness of the cost of such service. In investigating the latter consideration the commissions must deal with two problems: first, whether the entire
revenues of the utility are unreasonably high or low; and second, whether
the revenues are collected on an equitable basis from the individual consumers of the utility product.2 Breach of the latter demand is usually
caused by unduly preferential or discriminatory rates.3 Many commissions have considered whether the free transfer phase of street railway
fares was unreasonably discriminatory. Tramways are generally laid out
in a grid pattern with transfer privileges between lines so that any part
of the system can be reached from any other part on payment of the base
11. See Bruton, The Income Tax and the Family Partierships-TheCulberston
PA. L. REv. 143 (1949).
12. See Paul. Famiky Partnership inTax Avoidance, 13 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
121 (1945).
13. INT. REv. CODE §§ 181, 182, and 3797(a). A similar approach has already
been taken in reference to short term intra-family trust. The Treasury issued regulations to describe the factors which will make the trust income taxable to the grantor.
See U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §§29.22(a)-21, 22 (1942).

Chapter, 98 U. OF

1. The Pennsylvania commission is typical of those throughout the country. It is
now organized and empowered by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, chap. 7 (Purdon, 1941).
2. BARNES, EcoNomics OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1942).

3. "No public utility shall, as to rates, make or grant any unreasonable preference
or advantage to any person . . . No public utility shall establish or maintain any
unreasonable difference as to rates, either as to localities or as to classes of service . . ." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1144 (Purdon, 1941).
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fare and, if necessary, a transfer. Since the necessity to transfer seemed
to be caused by traffic patterns adopted by the company itself, an early
New York commission ruling disallowed a charge on transfers as being
discriminatory. 4 A general issuance of free transfers has been ordered
when a railway supplied them to some parts of a city and not to others,
on the ground that such a practice was discriminatory. 5 The same term
has been used by a commission to condemn a system whereby a company
serving part of a city was charging for transfers to the lines of another
company serving other parts of the city.0 The California commission
refused to allow a tramway to charge for transfers on the ground that certain business localities would be unduly discriminated against by such a
fare structure.7 In general, commissions have seen little realistic basis for
finding transfer charges reasonable since transferring itself has no necessary
relation to the length of the ride," or the cost to the company, or the value
to the user of the service.0 The only time a commission has ordered such
a charge when a revenue increase was deemed necessary was in the case
of a San Francisco company where three lines were operating in competition at certain points and any other adjustment would cause a serious
shift in patronage. 10 The commission in the instant case reversed accepted
rules and held that any free transfer system is discriminatory, and when the
base fare is raised to a sufficiently high point such discrimination becomes
unreasonable and unlawful. 1"
Equitable distribution of the cost of production to consumers of utility
products is extremely difficult since the nature of a utility demands great
initial investment in plant and facilities, the cost of which constitutes a
non-varying burden upon the enterprise. While a utility product usually
cannot be stored the companies are charged with a public duty to supply
any instantaneous demand, thus the quantum of investment must be adequate to supply the peak drain. 12 The greatest part of the cost of service
rendered therefore is not proportionate to the amount of the product used
but to the contribution of that use to the maximum load that the utility
must bear at any time. This theory applies to street railways. The greater
part of the cost of operating a transit company is the investment in and
up-keep of the vehicles themselves. These must be supplied in sufficient
number to handle reasonably the maximum demand at all points of the
system at any time. The cost of operating any one line is therefore predominately the cost of maintaining the number of vehicles demanded at its
most crowded points at the "rush hour". Uncontradicted evidence offered
by the company in the instant case showed that the actual cost to the company of any trip is predominately determined by the number of controlling
load points the rider passes through at peak hours. The commission's
order imposes upon the forty per cent of the car-riders who use transfers
4. In re Third Avenue Railway Co., 100 P.U.R. 1916E (N.Y., 1st Dist. 1918).
5. City of Joplin v. S.W. Missouri R.R., 47 P.U.R. 1916E (Mo. 1916).
6. In re Capitol Transit Co., 46 P.U.R. (N.S.) 506 (D.C. 1942).
7. In re Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 66 P.U.R. 1922A (Cal. 1921).
8. In re Norfolk and Bristol St. Railway Co., 411 P.U.R. 1915E (Mass. 1915).
9. In re Elmira Water, Light & R.R. Co., 690 P.U.R. 1921B (N.Y., 2d Dist.
1921).
10. In re Market Street Railway Co., 20 P.U.R. (N.S.) 278 (Cal. 1937).
11. This somewhat euphuistic rationale might be questioned. In the singlevehicle riders had been paying more than their share of the old costs, a rise in costs
would not force them to bear any greater percentage of the total cost. It is difficult,
therefore, to see how the discrimination alleged by the commission has, by a base
fare rise, become an unreasonable one.
12. TRAcHsEI, PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATI N (1947).
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because of the traffic pattern designed by the company 1- all the increased
costs of operation when the facts of the case tend to prove that their use of
the facilities costs no more than that of the single-vehicle riders. In view
of this, the commission's order could well be said to be discriminatory, but
true or not, in such a close case where the revenue gain to the company is
the same whichever plan is adopted, the commission should not have substituted its own ideas for those of the company's managers.' 4 If the commission did not want merely to boost the base fare because of public pressure, it might have suggested a more economically sound measure, for
example, a fare differential to stimulate off-peak usage. 15 The commission here has not only ignored persuasive precedent and the policies of
the company's management but has issued an order in conflict with accepted
principles of utility economics. However, while the company's proposed
plan aroused public indignation, the implementation of the commission's
order seemed to dissipate this agitation, which result might, after all, be the
true test of the value of a commission decision.
Sales-Perishable Agriculture Commodities Act-Right of Buyer
to Reject Under Contract "F. 0. B. Shipping Point Acceptance Final,"
if Fraud is Established-Seller shipped buyer grapes under a contract
which provided "f. o. b. shipping point acceptance final". 1 Originally, the
grapes had been sold to a consignee in Missouri, who found them somewhat decayed and rejected them. Seller, knowing of this, resold and
diverted them to buyer. Upon arrival, buyer, finding substantial decay,
promptly rejected and notified seller who brought proceedings before the
Secretary of Agriculture under the Perishable Agriculture Commodities
Act 2 for damages sustained through buyer's rejection. The award of reparations to the seller was reversed and remanded since buyer under contract
"f. o. b. shipping acceptance final" has a right to reject shipment, if fraud
is established. Joseph Martinelli Co., Inc. v. Simon Siegel Co., 176 F. 2d
98 (1st Cir. 1949).
At common law fraud rendered all contracts voidable, and a buyer
induced to enter a contract by the fraud of a seller, had the right to
repudiate the contract and to refuse the goods. 3 Section 73 of the Uniform
Sales Act does not change this doctrine. 4 However, the federal Perishable
13. Indeed, company managers showed that the Philadelphia system was laid out
so that the whole city, by the use of transfers, would be persuaded to use the subway and elevated lines to reach and leave the city's center.
14. "The commission is no 'super board of directors' ", see Northern Pennsylvania
Power Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 333 Pa. 265, 267, 5 A.2d 133,
134 (1939).
15. Such a plan, along with other innovations met with success in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, In re Milwaukee Electric Rwy. & Light Co., 289 P.U.R. 1931E (Wis.
1931).
1. This term has been defined under the Perishable Agriculture Commodities
Act to mean that the buyer accepts the produce f.o.b. cars at shipping point without
recourse. Simon Siegel Co. v. Joseph Martinelli Co., 6 A.D. 778 (1949). Cf. 7
CODE FED. REGS. §46.24(m).
2. 46 STAT. 531 (1930), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §499a et. seq. (1946).
3. E.g., Pike's Peak Paint Co. v. Masury, 19 Colo. App. 286, 74 Pac. 796 (1903);
Como Orchard Land Co. v. Markham, 54 Mont. 438, 171 Pac. 274 (1918); Allan v.
Lake, 18 Q.B. 560, 118 Eng. Rep. 212 (1852) ; BENJAMIN, SALES 446, 472 (5th ed.
1906).
4. This provision states, in effect, that in cases of fraud the common law shall
apply. Hostler Coal & Lumber Co. v. Stuff, 205 Iowa 1341, 219 N.W. 481 (1928);
5 WILLISTON, CoNTAcRs § 1523 (Rev. ed. 1937). See also A.L.I., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-723 (May, 1949 Draft).
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Agriculture Commodities Act makes it unlawful for a buyer to reject
"without reasonable cause" any perishable agricultural commodity sold
in interstate commerce. 5 "Without reasonable cause" has been interpreted
to include a rejection for any reason of a commodity sold under a contract
"f. o. b. shipping point acceptance final". 6 Under such an interpretation
the buyer must accept the commodity and his only remedy is to proceed
under the Act to recover damages. 7 Faced, for the first time," with the
issue of whether seller's fraud should enlarge the buyer's rights under the
Act, the court relied on common law principles and held that the buyer
may reject. The court proceeded on the theory that the Act presupposes
a valid contract, and contracts induced by fraud may be avoided at the
election of the person defrauded. The buyer in the instant case elected to
reject the goods, the contract became void, and the Act became inapplicable.
The purpose of the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act was to
suppress unfair and fraudulent practices in the marketing of perishable
agricultural commodities. 9 It was designed for the protection of the seller
so that when certain limiting phrases such as "f. o. b. shipping point
acceptance final" were used in the contract, the burden of disposing of the
goods would be placed on the buyer. 10 The objective was to prevent
produce from becoming distress merchandise in a declining market. This
was accomplished by discouraging unwarranted rejections of produce,
which would ordinarily be at a point so distant that it would be too expensive for the seller to enforce his legal rights." The purpose of using such
limiting phrases was to protect the seller from fraud on the part of the
buyer, not to protect a fraudulent seller. In this situation, therefore,
the buyer's rights must be the same as those which existed prior to the
passage of the Act, i. e., the right to reject where he has been defrauded
by the seller. The Court in the instant case left open the question of what
constitutes fraud. A narrow interpretation of fraud might achieve the
result that nothing would take a case out of the Act; whereas under a
liberal interpretation almost any breach of warranty might be called fraud,
thus emasculating the Act. Therefore, the impact of the present decision
will depend upoii how courts in the future interpret what quantum of fraud
is necessary to give a buyer the right to reject.' 2 To reach a result that
would be most in line with the spirit of the Act, fraud should be held to
exist only where the seller knew at the time of the sale that the goods
were defective.
5. 46 STAT. 531 (1930), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §499b(2) (1946).
6. E.g., L. Gillarde Co. v. Martinelli & Co., 168 F.2d 276 (1st Cir. 1948),
amended on rehearinq, 169 F.2d 60 (1st Cir. 1948) ; Le Roy Dyal Co. v. Allen, 161
F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1947) ; Nick Argondelis v. Senter Bros., Inc., 4 A.D. 420 (1945) ;
D. B. Bruno & Co., Inc. v. S. Goldsamt, Inc., 1 A.D. 605 (1942). None of these
cases involved seller's fraud.
7. 46 STAT. 531 (1930), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 499f(a-e) (1946) ; Le Roy Dyal
Co. v. Allen, supra.

8. Instant case at p. 101.
9. 72 CONG. REc. 8537 (1930).
10. For other phrases reaching the same result see 7

CODE FED.

REGs. § 4624

(1949).
11. L. Gillarde Co. v. Martinelli & Co., 169 F.2d 60 (1st Cir. 1948) ; Le Roy Dyal
Co. v. Allen, mpra; SEN. REP. No. 6, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1929) ; 72 CONG. REc.
8538 (1930).
12. The Court, however, did hold that if the defrauded party to a contract breaks
it before he discovers the fraud, he may nevertheless assert the fraud as a defense
as soon as he discovers it.
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Taxation-Constitutional Limitation on Jurisdiction to Impose
Slack Tax-Decedent, a resident of Wisconsin, died leaving an estate
consisting of tangible property, 86% of which was located in that state
and the remainder in two other states. Wisconsin, in addition to its ordinary inheritance tax,' imposed a slack tax 2 designed to take full advantage
of the 80% state credit provisions provided by the Federal Estate Tax.3
This slack tax was computed by deducting from the Federal credit on the
entire estate an allowance for any inheritance taxes paid not only to Wisconsin but also to other states. In addition, Wisconsin attempted to levy
an emergency tax 4 which amounted to 30% of all taxes it had previously
collected. The state supreme court sustained the emergency tax on the
ground that, since more than 80% of the estate was located within its
borders, Wisconsin had not exceeded its jurisdiction in basing the tax
on the full amount of the credit since such credit was, in turn, based upon
80% of the Federal Tax.5 On appeal, the judgment was reversed on the
ground that the tax constituted an unconstitutional attempt to tax the
inheritance of tangible property outside Wisconsin's jurisdicion. Treichler
v. State, 70 Sup. Ct. 1 (1949).
While the effort to determine a single tax situs in the administration
of the due process clause has been abandoned with respect to intangible
property,0 the instant case reaffirms its application with respect to tangible
property.7 The several states have generally followed two methods in
determining their jurisdiction with respect to the slack tax. Some states
determine the federal credit to be used as the basis for its slack tax, by
pro rating the share of such credit to the property within the state regardless of the taxpayer's domicile.8 Under this view, while the tax in another state may more than absorb the entire credit, no constitutional objection is presented since no state purports to tax other than property
within its jurisdiction.9 Under the other method, states have limited their
slack tax to residents, computing it on the basis of the entire federal credit
irrespective of the property's location, but at the same time, allowing deductions for any tax paid to other states.' 0 This provision would apparently permit the state to measure the tax on the basis of tangible property outside its jurisdiction since the tax imposed by other states might
not absorb all of their pro rata share of the federal credit leaving some
credit subject to the domiciliary's tax. Nevertheless, litigation on this
point has been inhibited because the taxpayer, who must pay the same
amount of tax to the Federal Government if the state tax is invalidated,
is not in a position to show sufficient injury to challenge the state imposition." In the instant case, however, the additional 30% tax fur1. Wis. STAT. §72.01-72.24 (1947).

2. WIs. STAT. § 72.506 (1947).
3. INT. REv. CODE § 813b. The proportion of the credit is less than 80% of the
total federal tax today since the 80% is based only on the 1926 rates.
4. Wis. STAT. § 72.74(2) (Post war relief measures).
5. 35 N.W.2d 404 (Wis. 1949).
6. Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport, 331 U.S. 486 (1947); Utah v.
Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942) ; Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939).
7. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 473 (1925) (inheritance tax); Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905) (property tax).
8. For a collection of statutes see Perkins, Federal Estate Tax Credit Clause,
13 N.C.L. REv. 271 (1934).
9. Simco v. Shirk, 146 Tex. 259, 206 S.W.2d 221 (1947) ; But cf. In re Watson's
Estate, 36 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Surr. 1945).
10. See note 8 supra. Examples of states having this type legislation are Ohio,
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.
11. Cf. Knowles Estate, 295 Pa. 571, 145 Atl. 797 (1929).
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nished the injury giving the taxpayer standing. The contention that the
tax was based on property within the state since its percentage was more
than that of the Federal credit is without foundation. 12 The instant court,
as a matter of fact, ignored it in finding this levy an unconstitutional attempt to tax tangibles outside the jurisdiction. Thus, at least by inference,
the court indicated that the method of computing the slack tax used was itself subject to constitutional objection.
With but one dissent, the decision reaffirms the single tax situs doctrine as applied to tangible property in the face of strong criticism of the
doctrine. 13 Much of the justification for the doctrine of a single tax situs
has been a desire to prevent more than one state from imposing a tax on
the same property.14 The instant case represents a situation where even
this justification is absent since the tax under attack automatically prevents double taxation by allowing the taxpayer to deduct the taxes imposed by other states on the same property. 15 The effect of this decision
with respect to slack taxes is to cast doubt upon the validity of one of
the methods of computing the slack tax, viz., deducting taxes paid to other
states from the entire federal credit. Such a method of computing the
slack tax would seem to be a desirable means of enabling a state to provide a greater degree of equality between those of its residents with
property outside the state and those with property totally within. By
comparison, the pro rating of the federal credit on the basis of the property
within the state leaves the resident taxpayer affected by rates in other
jurisdictions sufficiently high to absorb more than their share of the
federal credit. Nevertheless, no serious challenge to existing slack tax
systems is to be anticipated despite this decision, since, absent the special
emergency tax, no taxpayer6 will probably have sufficient standing to challenge its constitutionality.'
12. See Frick v. Pennsylvania, supra, at 494.
13. E.g., Bittker, Taxation of Out of State Tangible Property, 56 YALE L.J. 640
(1947).
14. The result has also been justified on the theory that the property where the
state is located alone furnishes sufficient protection to enable it to base its tax on the
value thereof. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, upra. But the state
of the owner's residence also furnishes protection to him for which they could
logically base their tax on his ability to pay which would take into account tangibles
outside the state. See Bittker, supra note 13, at 650.
15. Cf. Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63 (1911) (upholding state
tax on ships owned by resident without taxable situs elsewhere).
16. See note 11 supra.

